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Abstract
• Expert evaluations of the safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical and medical
devices, prior to marketing approval or reimbursement listing, collectively represent a globally
important public good. The scientific processes involved play a major role in protecting the public
from product risks such as unintended or adverse events, sub-standard production and
unnecessary burdens on individual and governmental healthcare budgets.
• Most States now have an increasing policy interest in this area, though institutional arrangements,
particularly in the area of cost-effectiveness analysis of medical devices, are not uniformly advanced
and are fragile in the face of opposing multinational industry pressure to recoup investment and
maintain profit margins.
• This paper examines the possibility, in this context, of States commencing negotiations toward
bilateral trade agreement provisions, and ultimately perhaps a multilateral Treaty, on safety, efficacy
and cost-effectiveness analysis of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Such obligations may
robustly facilitate a conceptually interlinked, but endangered, global public good, without
compromising the capacity of intellectual property laws to facilitate local product innovations.
Background: regulating the global medicines and 
medical devices industries
The global market for "innovative" pharmaceuticals and
medical devices has become one of the most significant
sectors for government healthcare spending, particularly
as higher corporate rents are leveraged from elevated intel-
lectual property standards[1]. Its influence on public pol-
icy is set to expand exponentially, as the products
involved are innovatively re-shaped by nano and gene
technology and priced accordingly[2]. Aging populations
and normal profit-seeking behaviour by multinational
corporate manufacturers and private insurers, in a regula-
tory environment with diminished government controls,
are also likely to be major factors[3].
"Medicines" may be divided into subcategories depend-
ing on whether they are available to the public by physi-
cian prescription or over-the-counter pharmacy sales,
have synthetic or biologic components, are patented or
generic, or are complementary (outside the traditional
medical evidence base) in nature[4]. The term "medical
device" has been defined in various terms by regulatory
agencies, but generally refers to any instrument, appara-
tus, appliance, or related article that is intended for use in
Published: 28 March 2006
Globalization and Health 2006, 2:5 doi:10.1186/1744-8603-2-5
Received: 30 September 2005
Accepted: 28 March 2006
This article is available from: http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
© 2006 Faunce; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Globalization and Health 2006, 2:5 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
Page 2 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
the diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment, or alle-
viation of disease, or is intended to affect the structure or
function of the human anatomy[5].
Efficacy and safety evaluation are now routine initial reg-
ulatory hurdles in most nations for any newly created pre-
scription medicine and medical device. Animal studies
(particularly for teratogenicity, carcinogenicity and muta-
genicity) and then three phase human clinical trial data,
are widely used for institutional approval (licensing or
registration) of pharmaceuticals and a variety of other
sources for post-approval surveillance[6].
As shall be discussed in more detail, nations such as Can-
ada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK, possess institu-
tions that have achieved international recognition for
excellence in cost-effectiveness analysis of pharmaceuti-
cals ("CEAP") as a final component of safety and efficacy
evaluation ("SE/CEAP")[7]. The literature and institu-
tional arrangements for cost-effectiveness analysis of med-
ical devices ("CEAMD") after safety and efficacy approval
("SE/CEAMD"), is much less developed[8]. This article
will discuss some significant recent industry challenges to
such processes.
International benchmark organizations for medicines and
medical devices safety and efficacy evaluation, such as the
US Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") have also
recently come under intense public and governmental
scrutiny for perceived inadequacies and conflicts of inter-
est[9]. Additional concerns in this area are corporate-lead
international harmonisation processes in safety and effi-
cacy evaluation of medical devices, that appear to under-
mine the precautionary principle by shifting the burden of
proof to public authorities post marketing approval[10].
Given that such regulatory processes are under pressure
from multinational industry interests, this article explores
whether the most efficient public or State response may be
to work toward a multilateral treaty in this area.
The global spread of medical safety, efficacy and 
cost-effectiveness analysis
Increasing international interest exists in CEAP prior to
government reimbursement as a necessary value approval
stage after safety and efficacy evaluation[11]. Australia
was one of the first nations to embrace this concept,
through Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme ("PBS") guide-
lines, in the early 1990s[12]. The resultant processes,
operating under the aegis of Australia's Pharmaceutical
Benefits Advisory Committee ("PBAC"), are now widely
regarded as giving Australia world class expertise in the
area[13]. They have a major role in implementing the
National Medicines Policy ("NMP") 2000, the four central
objectives of which are: timely access to the medicines
that Australians need, at a cost individuals and the com-
munity can afford; medicines meeting appropriate stand-
ards of quality, safety and efficacy; quality use of
medicines; and maintaining a responsible and viable
medicines industry[14]. A major advantage of the Austral-
ian system, in that the monopsony buying power of the
Federal government can build on CEAP prior to Federal
formulary listing to achieve major price reductions from
industry[15].
The New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management Agency
("PHARMAC") was originally established under the
Health and Disabilities Services Act (1993) (NZ) (now the
Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (NZ)) with the spe-
cific purpose of improving the management of Govern-
ment expenditure on pharmaceuticals already approved
on safety and efficacy grounds. PHARMAC, with the
assistance of independent medical experts on the Pharma-
cology and Therapeutics Advisory Committee ("PTAC")
and its specialist sub-committees, manages, on cost-effec-
tiveness grounds set out in guidelines, a Federal formu-
lary, known as the Pharmaceutical Schedule. Patients and
their advocacy groups have input into PHARMAC's listing
decisions through a Consumer Advisory Committee. One
of its major advances involves the use of tendering for low
cost generic medicines[16].
Cost-effectiveness evaluation was introduced as a interre-
lated evaluation with safety and efficacy approval, by the
Canadian provinces of Ontario[17]. and British Columbia
in the early 1990's[18]. The Canadian Expert Drug Advi-
sory Committee ("CEDAC") now operates under the
Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment
("CCOHTA") to create cost-effectiveness recommenda-
tions for ten provincial and three territory governments,
as well as specific Federal programs (for example, veterans
and also indigenous people)[19]. The Canadian Patented
Medicines Prices Review Board ("PMPRB") sets a maxi-
mum "factory gate" price for new, patented "break-
through" drugs, based on the median price in seven
OECD nations specified in regulations (France, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and the U.S.), most of
which (apart from the US) rely on some form of CEAP to
guide government reimbursement decisions. The PMPRB
attempts to also ensure that most new patented drug
prices are limited to those of comparable pharmaceuticals
sold in Canada and that existing patented drug prices in
that nation cannot increase by more than the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), or become the highest in the world[20].
Although it does not advertise the fact, the PMPRB
appears to utilise a form of CEAP[21].
In Europe safety and efficacy considerations fall within
the European Medicines Agency Guidelines on Risk Man-
agement Systems for Medicinal Products for Human
Use[22]. Governments in most OECD countries (as wellGlobalization and Health 2006, 2:5 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
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as those mentioned above) utilise forms of CEAP in con-
junction with safety and efficacy evaluations[23]. Bel-
gium, Finland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden have
introduced formal cost-effectiveness as a routine "fourth
hurdle" after quality, safety and efficacy determina-
tion[24]. The Hungarian Office of Health Technology
Assessment of the National Institute for Strategic Health
Research has a mandatory role in granting social insur-
ance subsidies related to medicines and medical
devices[25]. The resultant expert recommendation may
allow the creation of formularies for either positive or
negative government reimbursement of pharmaceutical
prices[26]. As well as cost-effectiveness, cost-utility, cost-
benefit and cost-minimisation approaches are uti-
lised[27]. CEAP is often linked with reference pricing,
which may involve a government reimbursing the average
or lowest price in a therapeutic grouping of prescription
medicines[28]. The UK Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme ("PPRS")[29]. links government control over
manufacturer profits with a negative (non-reimbursed)
list and cost-effectiveness guidance from the National
Institute of Clinical Excellence ("NICE")[30]. Though also
utilising expert analysis of systematic reviews and model-
ling, unlike Australia's PBAC, NICE commissions evalua-
tions on classes of drugs, rather than having them
performed by submitting corporations for specific prod-
ucts[31].
In the United States, safety and efficacy evaluations follow
the FDA pharmacovigilance and risk management action
plans[32]. CEAP is less widely utilised in conjunction
with safety and efficacy analysis at the Federal level[33].
The same true in Japan[34].Industry critics have pointed
to methodological flaws such as vague definitions of ther-
apeutic class and the difficulty of obtaining good meas-
ures for societal preferences[35]. Politically dominant
private insurance and pharmaceutical corporations have
also linked CEAP with claims that indiscriminate, non-
evidence-based government charges could impede patient
choice concerning "innovative" medicines[36]. Individ-
ual healthcare facilities (with limited bargaining power)
in the US are encouraged by industry to develop formular-
ies useful to patient care using managed care guide-
lines[37]. A group of States have organised a Drug
Evaluation Review Process ("DERP") to assist their man-
aged care plans[38]. Health Management Organisations
("HMO's") have begun to require pharmaceutical manu-
facturers to make formulary submissions according to
guidelines prepared by the Academy of Managed Care
Pharmacy ("AMCP") and increased prominence has been
given to the work of the Agency for Health Research and
Quality ("AHRQ")[39]. Increasing prominence has also
been given to CEAP performed by the Veterans Health
Administration ("VHA") and the Pharmacoeconomics
Evaluation Center ("PEC") of the Department of
Defence[40].
CEAP and CEAMD are emerging fields of academic and
health policy interest for China, with the particular aim of
reducing the high proportion (44%) of pharmaceutical
expenditure in total healthcare expenditure[41]. The
South Korean government has been developing phar-
maco-economic guidelines after consultations with
experts in Canada and Australia[42]. In 2001 the Singa-
pore Ministry of Health appointed a Drug Cost Review
Task Force to revise cost-effectiveness processes in connec-
tion with a Standard Drug List[43]. In Thailand, three tax-
ation funded public insurance schemes provide a
minimum pharmaceutical package through a cost-effec-
tiveness evaluated National List of Essential Drugs[44].
Malaysia and Pakistan have governments very interested
in cost-effectiveness analysis of pharmaceuticals, but eval-
uations are limited by lack of funding, lack of trained per-
sonnel, lack of protected research time, limited access to
data and information, poor dissemination and official
uptake of research outcomes[45].
Developing countries in general frequently lack the
resources to train and support officials with the requisite
pharmaco-economic expertise to permit interlinked
safety, efficacy and CEAP/CEAMD evaluations on an effec-
tive, national scale[46]. To respond to community (and
their own employees') social justice concerns about pub-
lic health problems arising from high intellectual property
rents, the multinational pharmaceutical industry has pro-
posed self-regulatory alternatives emphasising pharmaco-
philanthropy, public-private partnership initiatives and
covert differential pricing[47]. Many developing nations,
such as India, rely upon the World Health Organisation's
("WHO") Essential Medicines List[48]. This assesses cost
of such pharmaceuticals per case, per cure, per month of
treatment, per case prevented, per clinical event pre-
vented, or, if possible and relevant, cost per quality-
adjusted life year gained[49].
The intense recent interest focused on the global problems
with safety and cost-effectiveness of pharmaceuticals, has
lead to medical devices becoming somewhat of a silent
partner in such regulatory discussions. The International
Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research
("ISPOR") is attempting to redress this imbalance[50].
Devices do create unique difficulties, particularly through
difficulties obtaining blinded trial data, the skill involve-
ment with diagnosis (they are not therefore fully embod-
ied technologies and have cost-effectiveness learning
curves), the frequency of product modifications and poor
development of regulatory theory in this area[51]. The
Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF) comprises rep-
resentatives from national medical device regulatoryGlobalization and Health 2006, 2:5 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
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authorities and industry from European Union, the
United States of America, Canada and Japan was estab-
lished ostensibly to encourage convergence in safety, effi-
cacy and cost-effectiveness evaluations, whilst also
promoting technological innovation and facilitating
international trade[52].
An important point to note from the above survey is that
established and effective forms of CEAP and CEAMD
work in close conceptual association with safety and effi-
cacy evaluations. We can now examine whether it may
make better regulatory sense to consider these as inte-
grally linked processes.
Advantages and disadvantages of SE/CEAP and 
SE/CEAMD
Affordable access to essential medicines is increasingly
recognised as a global public good, providing an essential
precondition to a reasonable quality of life for a signifi-
cant proportion of every human population, being sys-
tematically underprovided by private market forces and
imposing burdensome international externality costs on
third parties[53]. Further, affordable access to essential
medicines appears to be emerging, both academically and
in practise, as a core part of the international right to
health in article 12 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Cultural and Social Rights (article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights)[54]. One recent manifesta-
tion was the Doha Declaration, which affirmed the capacity
of WTO members to use to the full exceptions in the Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement ("TRIPS")
to promote public health by facilitating access to afforda-
ble medicines[55]. It is also specifically referred to in arti-
cle 14 of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights[56]. There seems to be little reason why
in theory or practice, affordable access to essential medical
devices should not to subject to the same considerations.
SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD processes, however, despite
their value to contemporary health technology assessment
and their capacity to facilitate access to medicines, have
not themselves been widely discussed as a global public
good, or as in any obvious way connected with normative
systems of distributive justice and the international
human right to health. Neither is primarily regarded as a
cost-containment strategy, chiefly because their related
formularies generally lack a capped budget and their fiscal
effects are predicated on prescribers adhering to recom-
mended indications[57]. SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD, create
no barriers to market access, or infringements of intellec-
tual property rights. They merely attempt to rationalise,
according to scientific evaluation of a hierarchy of clinical
trial evidence, government or other third party (private
health insurer) reimbursement expenditure [58].
SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD have three key advantages,
which may allow them to evolve into an important global
public good. The first involves an emphasis on scientific
evidence, the second a commitment to equity, to ensuring
value for a whole community and the third, the capacity
of SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD to act as fiscal brakes on rent
flowing to prior intellectual property owners without
inhibiting encouragement of local innovation through
high intellectual property protection.
One of the major disadvantages of SE/CEAP and SE/
CEAMD, is the common presence of methodological
flaws either in the evaluations by regulators, or in eco-
nomic submissions made by industry[59]. SE/CEAMD
faces comparative difficulties with "blinding," variable
physician technique and a shorter product life cycle. Yet,
they may benefit from easier in vitro assessment and a
greater capacity to characterise incremental design
changes by laboratory bench testing.
Another disadvantage, from the regulators' point of view,
is the lack of "hard" outcome data such as Quality
Adjusted Life Years ("QALYs"), particularly at initial eval-
uation of an innovative product. Manufacturers often
claim it is too early to produce such published trial data
and prefer to rely on surrogate outcomes, such as readily
measured changes in biochemical markers of disease.
Another disadvantage is that CEAP and CEAMD analysis
is often (unless it is linked to Federal monopsony buying
power) unable to question the initial price given by indus-
try. Direct, rather than inferred, evidence of marginal cost
of production is denied to evaluators, often on "commer-
cial-in-confidence" grounds. This means that CEAP and
CEAMD however excellently performed, often metaphor-
ically take place on an uncertain foundation[60]. There is
also issue of nations training enough pharmaco-eco-
nomic experts to facilitate CEAP and CEAMD for, for
example, both pre and post reimbursement listing.
SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD also commonly be "gamed" by
industry. If, for example, in a system such as that of Aus-
tralia, if a safety regulator approves 5 clinical indications,
this could lead to submissions to a cost-effectiveness eval-
uator on only one indication with the industry expecta-
tion of prescription "leakage" outside recommendations,
compromising fiscal savings for the taxpayer. Similarly,
expert evaluations considering a medicine's toxicity may
play an important CEAP role by factoring disutility into
modelled analysis, calculating compliance, or altering
indications.
Hasty safety approvals could endanger public health, yet
heightened industry pressure for "fast-tracking" may arise
from diverse sources: prior notification of submission
schemes, differing standards of proof, industry applica-Globalization and Health 2006, 2:5 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
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tions "salami slicing" indications to fit "orphan" drug cat-
egories, by inadequate conflict of interest protections
given full cost recovery from industry and pressure for
development collaborations with regulators. Over-cau-
tious rejections could delay patient benefits, reduce export
earnings and stifle investor confidence; yet safety classifi-
cations of innovative nanotechnology products at the
device/medicine 'boundary' will be distinctly complex.
The public may react adversely to new internationally har-
monised medical devices safety regulations that shift bur-
dens of proof to safety regulators after approval, possibly
in anticipation of the difficulty in obtaining credible pub-
lished trial data in this area (recruitment of subjects to
nanomedicine safety and cost-effectiveness trials will be
unusually difficult). The limited published systematic
reviews, may unduly restrict SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD for
nanotechnology products to surrogate outcome measures,
rather than quality-adjusted life years.
Threats from global industry interests
Though well entrenched in the policies of most States,
evolution and enhancement of SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD
as a global public good should not be taken for granted.
Brand name pharmaceutical multinationals, in particular,
are currently involved in a global strategy, using interna-
tional trade arrangements, carefully funded and seeded
academic articles, strategic surveys of relevant processes in
Europe and Asia (and how well they respond to the cor-
porate lobbying principle of innovation), to separate cost-
effectiveness analysis from safety and efficacy evaluations
and central government monopsony buying power and
replace it with medicines provision models emphasising
privatised insurance,[61]. medicines savings
accounts[62]. and direct-to-consumer advertising[63].
This process has already produced large scale adverse pub-
lic health consequences in China[64]. and Singapore[65].
Nevertheless it is still being promoted by industry as a
credible policy alternative to universal taxpayer-funded
access schemes in developed nations such as Australia,
usually in the guise of enhancing "consumer" choice and
responsibility[66]. Critics point to the lack of logic or
compassion in industry emphasising the decision-making
capacity of sick people, particularly the disabled and poor
patients, concerning their health and therapies, as if what
they were purchasing was a new car, house, or suit of
clothes.
The United Nations Human Development Report 2005
has emphasised, for example, that the World Trade
Organisation's ("WTO's") corporate-sponsored Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement,
along with so-called "TRIPS-Plus" intellectual property
protections in subsequent bilateral trade agreements, pose
a "pronounced" threat to global public health, particu-
larly through their expansive effect on prices for so-called
"innovative" medicines[67]. The US pharmaceutical
industry also has a powerful influence on the globally
influential US legislature[68]. The Medicare Prescription
Drug Improvement and Modernization Act 2003 (US), as one
instance, thwarted attempts to introduce a Federal PBAC-
type process in the US, specifically prohibiting the US gov-
ernment from using its bulk buying power for Medicare
beneficiaries from negotiating medicines price discounts
in a PBAC-style approach[69]. A Congressional Confer-
ence Agreement on this legislation obligated US negotia-
tors on the AUSFTA to report on whether that deal offered
opportunities to achieve the objectives of the Bipartisan
Trade Authority Act 2002 (US) including the "elimination
of government measures such as price controls and refer-
ence pricing which deny full market access" for US phar-
maceuticals[70].
Section 1123 of the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement
and Modernization Act 2003 (US), commissioned a study
by the US Department of Commerce, on so-called phar-
maceutical "price controls" implemented by SE/CEAP sys-
tems in thirteen OECD countries. It claimed that these
cost US drug purchasers from $5–$6 billion per year. It
argued that US drug prices should serve as a benchmark
for deregulated prices, despite the fact that they are 18–
67% higher than those in the relevant OECD coun-
tries[71].
An important issue here may be the role of Article 64 of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights ("TRIPS")[72]. The United States, for example,
subsequently has argued that the initial and subsequent
moratoria is over and the Non-Violation-Nullification of
Benefits ("NVNB") remedy must now be accepted, by all
WTO Members, as applying to the TRIPS Agreement[73].
At the WTO meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005,
United States negotiators attempted to obtain concessions
in return for their support for the continuance of the
NVNB moratorium[74]. NVNB claims, permitting dispute
resolution proceedings for breaching the "spirit" of a trade
agreement could both support and undermine CEAP,
depending on the undertakings made about it at the time
such agreements were entered. The Australian govern-
ment, for example, quite explicitly gave undertakings that
the fundamental architecture of Australia's CEAP system
would not be altered by the AUSFTA[75] and backed this
up by passing implementing legislation against the proc-
ess of patent "evergreening" predicated on such an
assumption. Crucially important in this context could be
Annex 2C (1) of the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement ("AUSFTA,") where "innovation" is uniquely
linked with the socially-oriented concepts of 'high quality
health care', 'affordability', 'accountability' and "objec-
tively demonstrated therapeutic significance'. Whether
"innovation" should sit within CEAP, or the patent sys-Globalization and Health 2006, 2:5 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
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tem, or both, is a major conceptual conundrum that prob-
ably goes to the heart of the industry agenda in this area.
On 1–2 December 2005, a meeting took place in Paris
under the auspices of the OECD "Project on Pharmaceuti-
cal Pricing Policies and Innovation." Inclusion of the term
"innovation" in the title discloses what was probably the
chief purpose of this Project (though attempts were made
by the US delegation to obfuscate this agenda, particularly
by initial statements ostensibly withdrawing support and
ensuring a significant role for nations such as Canada and
Mexico). This was to broach the first stages of implemen-
tation of the US Department of Commerce report men-
tioned previously. Its stated terms of reference appear to
confirm this. They are:
1) to add to the base of information about pharmaceutical
pricing policy in OECD countries and develop a taxon-
omy and framework for making international compari-
sons of policies [the European Union was running a
similar investigation already]
2) to analyze cross-national impacts and implications of
policies, particularly with respect to impact on pharma-
ceutical prices paid in other countries and impact on phar-
maceutical research and development[76].
Toward a multilateral treaty
It seems remarkable, in an age of corporate globalisation,
that medicines and medical devices national safety regula-
tors and cost-effectiveness evaluators continue to work
largely in formal isolation to assess the same products.
Given the importance of SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD to sus-
tainability and legitimacy of public health systems, it is
also peculiar that governments have not already perceived
the advantages of creating a multilateral treaty in this area.
One intermediate suggestion is to include provisions
establishing SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD committees or
working groups in bilateral trade agreements. The aims of
such arrangements would include fostering relevant inter-
national regulatory collaborations, capacity building
expertise (by facilitating the relevant trade in services) and
overcoming regulatory safety concerns that might provide
barriers to the entry of cheap generic medicines (for exam-
ple from China to Australia). Such provisions would not
impact adversely on intellectual property rights. Conse-
quently, they would not infringe any prohibitions on
restricting intellectual property rights or discriminating
against fields of technology emerging from the TRIPS
Agreement.
For each such provision, a government department (usu-
ally the respective Ministries of Health) would need to
assume responsibility for operationalising the related
obligations and requirements. Qualifications and process
of appointment of relevant experts would need to be
resolved, as would the reporting mechanisms. Establish-
ing such a mechanism in a trade agreement would pro-
mote SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD expertise in relevant
universities, building careers in this area, with the pros-
pects of governments saving more money as greater num-
bers of relevant experts become available to preform both
pre and post-listing evaluations.
Such a provision might be as brief as the following annex
at the end of a trade in goods chapter:
"Medicines and Medical Devices Safety, Efficacy and Cost-
Effectiveness Committee The Parties hereby establish this
Committee, comprising relevant officials and expert advisors
from each Party. Its primary objective shall be to promote dis-
cussion and mutual understanding, collaborations, training,
education and sharing of expertise with a view to enhancing
and developing techniques of, and research related to, safety,
efficacy and cost-effectiveness evaluations of medicines and
medical devices."
In time, the increased interest in SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD
generated by such provisions may lead to a Treaty on
Safety, Efficacy and Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation of Medicines
and Medical Devices. Such a Treaty could be sponsored
either by UNESCO, or the World Health Organisation
("WHO") or, hopefully, both organizations in collabora-
tion.
The relevant terms of reference could involve negotiations
in the following areas:
1) the appropriate interrelationship of safety, efficacy and
cost-effectiveness evaluations
2) the social theories that should underpin such evalua-
tions including the blance between global public goods
and private rights, perspectives on the relative importance
and interaction in this context of bioethical equity and
social justice, the international human rights to health,
international trade norms preventing non-tarriff barriers
and industry lobbying principles such as recognition of
innovation.
3) how to improve access by regulators, health profession-
als, consumers and industry to public data bases of large-
scale, randomised, double blind clinical trails involving
head to head comparisons using therapeutically equiva-
lent dosage forms for the most commonly prescribed
pharmacological analogues or non-drug therapies for the
same indication.Globalization and Health 2006, 2:5 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
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4) whether SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD can progressively
involve greater use of "hard" outcome measures, such as
deaths prevented or quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)
gained, rather than "surrogate" pharmacological out-
comes (for example low density lipoprotein levels or
blood pressure).
5) improving existing SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD systems
efficiencies in specifics such as reference pricing and ten-
dering for ultra low cost generic medicines, but also
whether the concept of "innovation" in relation to medi-
cines and medical devices should be defined to include
elements of safety, efficacy, affordability and objectively
demonstrated therapeutic significance.
6) discussions on post marketing responsibilities which
could include price-volume and binding health outcome
agreements between regulators and industry, as well as the
appropriate structure of vigilance trials, adverse incident
reporting, impact of fraud, prescribing habits and alterna-
tive or complementary therapies.
7) discussions on how to globally capacity build SE/CEAP
and SE/CEAMD as a career for health professionals and
facilitate trade in services training programmes, expert
exchanges and collaborations.
8) discussions on improving data in areas such as choice
of comparitor, measurement of relevant costs and bene-
fits, length of follow up, peculiarities of local setting and
appropriate valuation of economic, clinical and patient-
reported (or humanistic) outcomes.
9) negotiations on public interest limits about commer-
cial-in-confidence protections and on disclosing local and
international marginal costs of production for each drug.
Important principles on the issue of commercial-in-confi-
dence, for example, emerging from the parallel processes
of UK NICE and Canadian CCOHTA, are that it should
not so inhibit transparency as to prevent manufacturers
disclosing enough information to make their submission
understandable to the public or governments, or that it
should not endanger public safety and should not be set
unilaterally by industry[77].
10) horizon scanning processes to ensure all Parties are
speedily appraised of recommended SE/CEAP and SE/
CEAMD regulatory responses to developments in new
fields such as nano and gene-based technologies.
Conclusion
This article has argued that despite its obvious attraction
to fiscally responsible governments in a time of ageing
demographics, neither the continuance, nor enhance-
ment of science-based SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMD processes
should be taken for granted. Nation states are just becom-
ing used to the change in sovereignty associated with fully
privatised healthcare sectors coexisting with international
trade obligations to provide national treatment to multi-
national corporations. In this context, much official con-
cern has been expressed about growing public
disenchantment with the policy influence of the multina-
tional pharmaceutical industry[78].
There are both responsive and pro-active reasons for seek-
ing to include provisions facilitating SE/CEAP and SE/
CEAMD in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
The responsive reason relates to ensuring a more transpar-
ent debate about the future enhancement of these proc-
esses in relation to an industry agenda which often
appears to perceive their stringent application as an
impediment to their freedom to manufacture, obtain
speedy safety and efficacy approval and market direct to
both patients and physicians, with only limited stringent
scientific scrutiny about either the marginal cost of pro-
duction or overall comparative worth to the community.
The pro-active reasons for including SE/CEAP and SE/
CEAMD in trade agreements relate to the possibility of
creating an important, transparent playing field where the
next generation of great debates between public goods
and private rights in this sector can take place. They also
concern the facilitation of trade-in-services, capacity
building relevant expertise, improving relevant processes
(including the efficiency of sharing data and reviews), as
well as the need to commence negotiations with pharma-
ceutical multinationals on a more rational approach to
important issues such as commercial-in-confidence and
marginal cost of production.
Possible disadvantages in proceeding this way include the
possibility of such a treaty becoming a lightning rod for a
contrary agenda by the pharmaceutical and medical
device industries. The aims of such a treaty, for example,
could be altered to provide a vehicle for corporate strate-
gies such as "linkage" of regulatory evaluation of a generic
pharmaceuticals patent status with quality and safety eval-
uation prior to marketing approval, or reversal of the pre-
cautionary principle with regard to regulatory approval of
new medical device technologies.
At this point in the age of corporate globalisation, perhaps
it is time to start respecting scientific cost-effectiveness
evaluation of medicines and medical devices as a poten-
tially endangered global public good, which should not
be conceptually or operationally separated from safety
and efficacy evaluations. Governments wishing to take a
popular strategy to elections with an ageing population
could promote the type of multilateral treaty discussed
here (or provisions facilitating SE/CEAP and SE/CEAMDGlobalization and Health 2006, 2:5 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/5
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in bilateral trade deals) as a rational and scientific way of
restraining medicines prices and ensuring value for public
expenditure in this area of the health sector.
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